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This Article's claim is that deterrence in criminal law is composed of
four oft-competing goals that ought to be taken into account when
calibrating sanctions. Consider an offender, such as an armed robber or
kidnapper, who threatens to commit a yet more serious crime unless the
victim surrenders. The first goal, or dimension, of deterrence is to deter the
threat, or crime in general, and this suggests a high sanction for the armed
robbery or other threatening crime. A second goal is to deter escalation, in
this case the execution of the threat once issued. This goal normally
suggests a large gap between the sanctions for lesser and greater crimes,
in order to discourage escalation. Given a natural or practical ceiling to
criminal penalties, the suggested gap often implies relatively low sanction
for the lesser crime, or threat, and some sacrifice of direct deterrence.
Two other goals, or dimensions of deterrence, have been unrecognized
by academic commentators and legislatures. By extending the analysis to
include behavior by victims, it becomes apparent that law ought to make
the offender’s threat incredible to victims. If the threat can be weakened,
victims will be less inclined to submit, and then offenders will have less
reason to threaten in the first place. This third dimension suggests a large
gap between the sanctions for the lesser (threat) and greater (execution)
crimes; if the gap is small, victims will recognize that the offender has little
to lose from continuing on and executing his threat, and these victims will
submit and make the criminal’s threat profitable, thereby encouraging yet
more criminal activity.
A fourth, equally novel, dimension of deterrence is the ability of law to
make incredible the implicit promise by a threatener not to escalate if the
victim submits. When this implicit promise is incredible, victims will again
tend not to submit to the threat, and offenders will in turn issue fewer
threats. To achieve this goal, the sanction for repeating a threat following
submission by the victim should be low; victims will be less apt to submit to
a threat if they realize that submission will often bring on another crime, or
threat. The idea—which should be applied with caution— is familiar from
blackmail; a victim who thinks the blackmailer will return for further
*
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payments will not pay the first time, and the blackmailer, in turn, will be
discouraged.
Optimal deterrence requires that criminal law should be attentive to
the four dimensions described above. This Article presents a model for how
law can do so and better accomplish its deterrent function.
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INTRODUCTION
Ancient law punished only completed crimes, but law has
evolved to sanction many attempts and threats. 1 Moreover, many
completed crimes are platforms for escalation to more serious
crimes, so that many crimes constitute implicit or explicit threats. 2
1

See Thomas Bittner, Punishment for Criminal Attempts: A Legal Perspective on
the Problem of Moral Luck, 38 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 51 (2008). The punishment of
attempts is easy to understand. When someone is apprehended just before
committing a robbery, murder, or other serious crime, it is almost impossible to
imagine a developed legal system, or professional police force, that would be
satisfied with preempting the crime and then simply warning the nascent criminal.
See also Leo Katz, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 276-300 (1987) (discussing attempts).
2
The marginal deterrence factor is less important for attempts because, at least in
principle, law deters completed crimes by deterring their attempt. There is no time
lag between the two, as there is for a threat and its execution. It is easy to see why
an offender apprehended one moment before pulling a trigger should be punished
and, if this were not the case, police would face impossibly difficult problems as
2
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Criminal activity often begins with a threat, or other low level crime,
because an offender prospers if he can acquire something of value
with mere words, the wave of a weapon, or a low-cost wrong. These
threats, as we will call them, are often cheap to inflict, but terrifying
to the victim. Modern law responds to this reality by criminalizing
“specific” threats as well as gateway crimes, but this Article argues
that the strategy is often misguided. Criminal penalties surely deter
some threats, including low-level crimes that serve as implicit
threats, and may reduce crime by removing convicted threateners
from the population but, once a threat is made, the penalty makes it
more likely that an offender who threatens will carry through on his
threat. 3 The offender may be insufficiently deterred because the
additional penalty for going beyond the threat is smaller than it
would be if the entire deterrent were marshaled against the second
step, or actual execution. In most areas of criminal law, it is reckless
to improve marginal deterrence by simply lowering the penalty for
the less severe crime, because this under-deters the less severe crime.
In the case of pure threats, there is more room to reduce the penalty
for the threat, or first step, but to see why this is so requires an
understanding of the credibility of threats.
These familiar deterrence goals are incomplete because they are
based on a fairly static analysis of the threatener’s perspective alone.
The value of the threat to the offender depends in large part on the
victim’s perceptions and likely response. If the victim finds the threat
of escalation credible, and submits to the offender, the offender is

they sought both to prevent harms and apprehend those likely to commit them. It is
because threats can be an alternative, or a cheap substitute, for a completed crime,
that they are of special interest.
3
For a pathbreaking and excellent technical discussion of this intuition – and why
it is not always correct once one takes costs and substitutions into account, see
David Friedman & William Sjostrom, Hanged for a Sheep -The Economics of
Marginal Deterrence, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (1993) (“In such a situation, one of
the considerations in setting punishments is the risk that a high punishment for one
crime may shift the offender to committing a different, and perhaps a worse, one”).
See also George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ.
526, at 527-28 (1970) (“Marginal costs are necessary to marginal deterrence.”);
Steven Shavell, A Note on Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 345
(1992) (showing that where criminal can substitute between two acts, optimal
sanction for one might well be below harm caused by the other in order to
influence choice of acts.) The basic marginal deterrence idea has been recognized
for 250 years or even 337 years in the Anglo tradition. See Friedman & Sjostrom,
id, at 345-46, notes 1 & 5. For the best-known early statement, see Jeremy
Bentham, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 201 (1802) (“Where two offenses are in
conjunction, the greater offense ought to be subjected to severer punishment in
order that the delinquent may have a motive to stop at the lesser”).

3
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better off, and wrongdoers are encouraged to make such threats
again. A novel argument in this Article, referred to as "primary"
credibility" is that, by lowering sanctions for threats, law could make
threats less credible and, therefore, less valuable to offenders. The
counterintuitive idea is that when the sanction attached to a threat is
high, the sanction for executing the threat becomes lower. When that
latter sanction is lower, the threat becomes more credible and victims
are more likely to submit. Submission increases the offenders’ profit
and criminal activity. By lowering the sanction for threats and
focusing law’s deterrence power on their execution, law can reduce
the profitability and volume of criminal activity. To be sure, the law
might distinguish situations in which it is plausible that victims have
the time and capacity to make considered responses to threats.
Our attention to credibility is a means of incorporating the
victim’s perspective and likely response to a threat. It enables a
dynamic analysis in which the threatener’s behavior depends in part
on the victim’s expected response, which depends of course on the
perceived threat. In turn, the analysis reveals a fourth dimension, or
goal of deterrence, that has also gone unnoticed in the legal
literature. We refer to it as "secondary credibility." The effect of a
threat depends in large part on the credibility of the offender's
implicit promise not to execute the threat, or not to re-threaten, if the
victim submits to the threat in the first place. Counterintuitively, if
the sanction for re-threatening is low, victims will realize that if they
surrender to the first threat, another may well follow. This can
discourage submission in the first place, especially when victims
have time to plan ahead or think through their responses to criminal
wrongdoing. In the long run, reduced submission makes criminal
activity less profitable.
The new dimensions introduced in this Article can be
distinguished from the more familiar marginal deterrence arguments.
The latter aim to deter the escalation of a crime; the armed robber,
for example, is hopefully deterred from killing witnesses. In contrast,
the credibility perspective adopts an earlier vantage point and seeks
to deter criminal activity at the outset.
These four dimensions of criminal deterrence—direct
deterrence, marginal deterrence of escalation, and then primary and
secondary credibility effects—can be illustrated by considering a
threatener, T, who targets a victim, V. T threatens force unless V
gives up something valuable. Assume that the sanction for using
force is 20, and the sanction for making the threat is 8, or
alternatively, 1. When the penalty attached to the threat is 8, the
sanction for its execution, which is to say the actual use of force, is
only 12. That might be too low to deter T from executing the threat
4
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he has issued. 4 If the sanction attached to the threat alone were 1,
however, T might not execute on his threat because of greater
marginal deterrence provided by the sanction of 19, applied to an
offender who uses force. The direct deterrence dimension likewise
considers the threatener’s perspective. If the penalty attached to the
threat is lowered in order to increase marginal deterrence, there is the
likelihood that offenders will be under-deterred, so that more threats
will be issued. This direct, rather than marginal, deterrence
consideration incorporates a substitution effect because offenders can
be expected to gravitate, or substitute, toward threat-making as its
sanction is reduced. 5 This substitution is insignificant if threats
themselves are harmless, but it is plausible that offenders
underestimate the injuries they will cause if they wave guns in the
air. And there are other reasons to be concerned about threats; they
impose anxiety costs, and some victims will submit to them without
pushing the threatener to decide whether or not to execute.
The third dimension is primary credibility, and its novelty
derives from incorporating the victim’s perspective within deterrence
theory. If T is often undeterred by the marginal penalty of 12 rather
than 19, then V will find T’s threat more credible when the sanction
for the threat is 8 rather than 1. The less T is deterred from violently
completing or escalating the crime, the more V finds the threat of
force credible. V will be more likely to submit when threats are
sanctioned and, correspondingly, a low sanction for the threat might
therefore reduce credibility and submission. The primary credibility
effect refers to the feedback on T. As decreased marginal deterrence
for escalation makes T’s threat more credible to V, T is encouraged
to threaten because V is more likely to submit. Remarkably, when
law penalizes threats severely, it can make threat-making, which is to
say most crime, more profitable.
Finally, there is the dimension of secondary credibility, which is
most apparent in cases like blackmail, where repeat threats haunt a
victim who has time to consider the best response to a threat.
Imagine a legal system that punished only the first instance of
successful blackmail, and provided no further penalty for a
blackmailer who, after receiving payment from a submissive victim,
returned for more. Knowing this at the outset, V is more likely to
stand up to the blackmailer and refuse to pay and, in turn, blackmail
4

The actual threat of the sanction to the criminal is discounted, of course, by the
probability of apprehension. See infra note 32.
5
The substitution label avoids the need to call it an under-deterrence, or
straightforward deterrence, problem, and to cause confusion regarding the
difference between marginal deterrence and straightforward deterrence.

5
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becomes less profitable.
It is apparent that law’s treatment of threats should depend on a
dynamic analysis that takes into account both the offender’s and
victim’s perspectives. In order to best structure criminal penalties it
is necessary to understand exactly how threats work, and what makes
them more or less credible. Much as the marginal penalty expected
by an offender affects the victim’s decision to submit to a threat, so
too the credibility of the threat as perceived by the victim affects the
offender’s threat-making. The less credible a threat, the less likely is
a victim to submit, and the less profitable is the criminal activity.
Part I therefore begins with an exploration of the ingredients of
credibility. The discussion continues to distinguish between primary
and secondary credibility. The former refers to the likelihood that the
threat will be carried out if the victim fails to submit. It depends on
execution costs, as the victim must believe that the threatener will
find it worthwhile to carry through on his threat if the victim fails to
submit. Secondary credibility refers to the reliability of the
threatener’s claim that submission will indeed preclude execution or
escalation. The discussion concludes by challenging the conventional
wisdom that repeat play guarantees the credibility of threats.
Part II sets out the four dimensions of criminal deterrence. It
begins by developing the marginal deterrence and substitution (direct
deterrence) effects from the offender’s perspective. The discussion
suggests that, in its different treatment of specific as opposed to more
general threats, law may already reflect a sophisticated
understanding of the interaction between marginal deterrence and
substitution. 6 This distinction offers a window into the argument that
we make about the benefit of allowing threats to go lightly punished.
The analysis then introduces victim behavior and explores the
interaction between criminal sanctions and the credibility of threats.
The discussion suggests a revamping of criminal penalties.
Part III extends the analysis to include the risk that offenders can
sink costs to enhance credibility. When threats are involved, these
sunk costs enhance the credibility of the threat exactly as criminal
penalties do when attached to mere threats, because both reduce the
marginal deterrence to escalation The strategy is most plausible
where the first step involves a significant fraction of the overall
costs. In turn, it can be a good strategy to deter the offender at this
first step, even though marginal deterrence with respect to the
6

Cf. Pedro Celis, When Is A Youtube Video A “True Threat”? 9 WASH. J. L. TECH.
& ARTS 227 (2014) (“Requiring subjective intent reduces the potential chilling
effect of § 875(c) by ensuring that only threats directed at specific individuals or
groups are subject to liability”).
6
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second, more serious, step is compromised. The discussion explores
the limits of this argument.
I. ASSESSING THREATS AND THE DANGER OF ESCALATION
A. Prerequisites for Credibility
Targets will not respond to threats in a way that makes the
threatener better off unless the latter’s threats are credible and
plausibly injurious. “Give me your wallet or I will shut down your
university for a day,” is neither, and is more likely to elicit
puzzlement than fright, or anyone’s wallet. Threats are most credible
when the cost of execution is low compared to what the threatener is
likely to gain. An extortionist-arsonist needs but a can of gasoline
and a few matches in order to make good on his threat; if his threat to
burn a shop owner’s place of business is credible, he might be able to
use the same tools repeatedly against many victims, and he might not
even need to use the tools at all.
A threat can be contrasted to its opposite number, a contractual
promise, which pledges a benefit rather than a harm. In the absence
of law, a threat of harm is often more credible than a promise of a
benefit because the promisor’s execution costs are usually high. For
example, when an employer promises a promotion and raise, the
employer must actually expend money to fulfill the promise and, of
course, the promisee must generally work hard to earn this money. In
contrast, as noted, an offender can threaten by waving a stick or other
weapon. Understandably, law intervenes to raise the offender’s
execution costs; the extortionist can wave a stick or fill a can of
gasoline, but criminal law causes him also to anticipate some
probability of apprehension and criminal penalty. In turn,
shopkeepers can forego some defensive measures because they count
on law to deter threatening offenders.
Assume that a threatener, T, makes a threat and has the power to
execute it, and that T’s target, or victim, V, knows this to be the case.
Assume further that V will find it cheaper to submit to T than to
suffer the injury that T can bring about if he executes. When these
conditions are met we say that the threat has primary credibility. Of
course, V may submit and then find that T executes anyway. Prior to
submission, V must therefore be confident that submission will not
be followed by execution, and that T will not return at a later date to
renew the threat. Thus, one reason blackmail is not more common is
that the target fears that the blackmailer will demand yet more
money, once the blackmailer learns that the target will pay for the

7
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photograph (or other evidence regarding a point of vulnerability) in
question. 7 We call these matters of secondary credibility. Note for
now that when V contemplates submission, V must estimate both
primary and secondary credibility – the likelihood that T will carry
through on his threat (primary credibility) and also that T will not
execute despite submission by V or threaten again (secondary
credibility). T in turn wants to be perceived as secondarily credible in
order to raise the probability that V will submit. The conventional
means for T to establish credibility is to have a history of reliability
through repeat play, a topic taken up below. 8
However credible T’s threat, V may at times be able to
neutralize the threat rather than submit to it. For example, V might
respond to T’s threat of “Your money or your life,” by taking out her
wallet and quickly destroying its contents. Few criminal threats offer
V this defensive opportunity, though such “scorched earth” strategies
are discussed later in this Article. 9
B. Execution Costs and Benefits
When T says “Your money or your life,” V knows that
execution is more likely the more money T thinks V possesses, and
the easier it is for T to grab that money without apprehension or
injury to himself. Primary credibility is therefore most likely where
there are low execution costs. And yet, secondary credibility is
enhanced when V perceives that T’s execution costs – following V’s
submission – are high. This apparent contradiction, or offset, is
penetrated by considering T’s varying execution costs and benefits
before and after V submits to the threat. In particular, even when
execution following submission is of low cost, if there is nothing else
for T to gain after V submits to the threat, V may well find T’s threat
primarily and secondarily credible. We will return to this point when
we discuss how criminal law affects credibility and how law might
manage T’s behavior following submission by V. 10
7

See Ronald Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655.
671 (1988) (arguing that blackmail does nothing more than transfer wealth and that
because there is no reason to think that it is a transfer to a higher valuing user, it is
sensibly prohibited by law).
Blackmailers face problems with respect to both primary and secondary credibility.
The first problem is one of correct pricing. If the blackmailer starts high and
lowers his price in the event of non-submission, his threat seems weak because his
primary credibility is weakened. And if he starts low and then raises the price in
the event of apparent submission, he seems secondarily unreliable.
8
Infra Section I.C.
9
Infra Part III.
10
Infra Section II.D.
8
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The significance of execution costs is made plain by considering
examples outside of the normal reach of criminal law, where
execution costs and credibility are divorced from the probability of
apprehension. If T says “My group will boycott your business unless
you do X” or “I will go on a hunger strike until you do Y,” V can
assess the cost of execution to T and calculate that the threat is
increasingly incredible as that cost rises. Setting aside the value of
adding to T’s reputation for reliability, the cost-benefit calculations
are straightforward. If T threatens a twenty-day hunger strike unless
V volunteers for one day at the local homeless shelter, V will doubt
the threat’s credibility and regard the threat as a signal of intense
feelings, to be sure, but not much more. 11
Matters can be further complicated when the victim’s secondary
credibility is in play. Just as V must worry that submission will not
guarantee safety, there are situations where T must be concerned
about V’s reliability. Imagine that T threatens his employer: “I see
you have discovered my embezzlements. If you report me to the
police, I will burn down your warehouse.” If V submits, and the two
parties agree that V will allow T to separate from the workplace
quietly, there is the possibility that V will surprise T and have him
arrested one year later. It is not easy for T to overcome this
credibility problem, and in turn it is likely that such threats will be
rare. 12
11

Even where apprehension and criminal punishment are excluded, the parties can
have difficulty assessing one another’s costs and benefits and, therefore,
credibility. Imagine a valued faculty member who threatens his law school’s dean
as follows: “Raise my pay by $50,000 or I will move to Law School Z.” It is
difficult for the dean to assess the threatener’s cost and benefit of execution,
because of the obvious information asymmetry; only the threatener knows whether
a move is costly or, in fact, much desired from the threatener’s perspective. It is
difficult if not impossible to make such a threat more credible without irrational
self-destruction on one side or the other. Consider, for example: “My threat is real.
If you do not submit, I will be gone, and to show you that I am not bluffing, if I do
stay without getting a raise, I will owe the law school, $100,000.” No dean would
“accept” this promise, or seek to enforce it, because it encourages the very
defection that the dean seeks to avoid (although in the long run it might reduce
defection). It is apparent that the high cost of execution makes some threats less
credible, but in virtually all cases it adds to secondary credibility.
12
It is tempting to say that submission suffers from the same credibility problem as
threats, or indeed that V implicitly “threatens” to reverse any submission. Working
backward, then, T will seek to make a demand, like handing over a wallet, that V
cannot easily reverse. Similarly, it is in T’s interest to make a threat that is both
immediately and secondarily credible. V should submit, believing that submission
will preclude execution. As will become apparent, this is part of the strategy of
increasing marginal deterrence for executing a threat, by decriminalizing the threat
itself.

9
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C. Repeat Play
If T is a repeat player, then it seems elementary that T’s threats
are more credible because V will calculate that T has reason to
execute in order to establish a reputation as a credible threatener. T is
also more reliable, or secondarily credible, than non-repeat or
anonymous threateners. In the most straightforward case, a criminal
enterprise can demand “protection” payments and garner an
attractive, extortion-induced revenue stream with just the right level
of threats and execution. Its primary credibility is enhanced because
a victim knows that the threatener has more to gain from execution
than does the typical mugger; future victims have no way of knowing
whether a mugger who confronts them has previously resorted to
violence, but a storekeeper asked to make protection payments by a
criminal enterprise knows that violence by this threatener is an
investment that will cause other storekeepers to submit, and may also
know of prior violence.
The organized criminal enterprise further enhances secondary
credibility by muscling out competitors, so that victims will know
that, if they submit, their vulnerability will not make them prey to
other offenders. 13 A terrorist enterprise that is organized around an
ideology may be even more formidable. If its frontline soldiers are
trained to welcome martyrdom, then they are known not to fear the
serious criminal sanctions attached to execution, and this improves
primary credibility. And if the organization controls a population,
then it is secondarily credible because of repeat play and an ability to
prevent copycat threats. 14 Indeed, a government that pays a terrorist
group to release hostages must have reason to believe either that the
group has the means to prevent repeat terror, or that the government
can prevent repeat terror and is simply paying for the release of
hostages. 15

13

Thomas C. Schelling, What is the Business of Organized Crime, 20 J. PUB. L. 71,
73 (1971) (arguing that one characteristic of organized crime is that it allows no
competition and exercises a monopoly); Shavell, supra note 3, at 1882 (stating that
a threatening party may want to carry out a threat when its demand has been
rejected for the purpose of establishing a reputation).
14
This repeat play is more significant than most, because the organization’s goal
makes it a long-term player, without the end-period problem discussed presently in
the text.
15
Harvey E. Lapan & Todd Sandler, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is The
Question, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 16 (arguing against the conventional wisdom that
governments should not bargain with terrorists over hostages in order not to
encourage further hostage-taking).
Criminal enterprises enhance credibility in other ways. They reduce the end-game
problem by operating over long time periods; they lower execution costs through
10
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But the conventional wisdom, or intuition, about repeat play and
credibility is overstated. For one thing, even where repeat play surely
does enhance credibility, the matter is complicated both by the
likelihood that V is also a repeat player, trying to build a reputation
for non-submission, and the possibility that repeat play has an
asymmetric impact on reputation. Furthermore, past reliability does
not provide much information about the future, except that it is better
than past unreliability. V does not know whether T is planning to
make future threats or is in fact in the last phase of a sting of sorts.
Consider an identifiable, serial, armed bank robber, facing a victim
who refuses to submit. If it is this repeat player’s last hurrah, it is less
profitable for him to shoot than it was earlier in his criminal career.
Firing his weapon and maiming a teller or officer may allow the
robber to steal a bank’s cash, and thus obtain a direct benefit, but
there is no need to invest in reputation, as this is his last robbery. In
contrast, someone who reliably performs as required by contracts
may be setting up a target for a sting. A contractual partner must
always have her guard up in case this is the promisor’s final act. 16
In sum, repeat play hardly guarantees credibility. In the absence
of repeat play, significant execution costs call credibility into
question. Threat-making is thus a tough line of work because
credibility is not easy to establish. But of course some wrongdoing
begins with threats because credibility is within reach and because
when submission is forthcoming, crime is a very profitable activity.
The question in these settings is when law should focus its deterrent
power on threats and when it should reserve this power to forestall
the serious harms brought about by the execution of that which was
threatened.
II. MARGINAL DETERRENCE, SUBSTITUTION, AND CREDIBILITY
EFFECTS
This Part explores four dimensions that must be taken into
account by legislatures when setting sanctions for criminal activities
initiated by threats, including crimes that serve as threats of
escalation to more serious crimes. The discussion begins with

training and professionalization; they lower the expected cost of apprehension by
investing in relationships with police and with legal defense teams, and by working
to make any prison terms less painful for its members than they are to other
convicted felons. They also enhance credibility through vigorous and welladvertised executions when targets fail to submit.
16
Repeat play might, however, show the target that the threatener has no fear of
the police or is a “bad type.” Still, the threat is less credible if the threatener is
operating in his final period.

11

NEW DIMENSIONS IN CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

marginal deterrence and uses this familiar tool to explain a
fundamental distinction in criminal law between specific and general
threats. We argue that a plausible explanation for the
decriminalization of general threats is the legislature's desire to
reserve enough marginal deterrence for the execution of the threat.
We then turn to the substitution effect – the risk of sacrificing direct
deterrence if marginal deterrence for execution is enhanced – and
explain the tradeoff between marginal deterrence and substitution.
Finally, we introduce two new dimensions, primary and secondary
credibility. When the sanction for threats is low, the primary effect is
sufficiently powerful to overwhelm the substitution effect.
Counterintuitively, the lower the sanction for threats, the less threats
will be used by offenders. Finally, when the sanction for escalation
after submission, or for rethreatening, is low, threats become less
credible.
A. General and Specific Threats
Criminal law has been unresponsive to, or dismissive of, general
threats, or nonspecific threats made to a group of people. The typical
requirements for a “criminal threat” include a victim in a state of
reasonably sustained fear for his or her personal (or family
member’s) safety as the result of a threat that is specific and
unequivocal. 17 The offender need not actually intend to execute the
threat and, indeed, may not have the ability to carry it out. 18 Thus,
we can expect a finding of criminal wrongdoing when someone
points a gun at a stranger and announces “Your money or your life,”
because the victim is singled out and has reason to fear bodily
harm. 19 In contrast, consider one who threatens: “I can’t stand the
17

See People v. Toledo, 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000). See West’s Ann. Cal. Penal Code
§ 422 (“that threat actually caused person threatened to be in sustained fear for his
or her own safety or that of his or her immediate family; and that threatened
person’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances”).
18
See People v. Toledo, id.
19
In Illinois, for example, the threat is referred to as an “intimidation.” 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. § 5/12-6.2(a), a category that includes threats of physical harm to the
victim, third parties, or property. Intimidation is a Class 3 felony, punishable by 210 years of imprisonment. Once there is contact, or battery, the use of a firearm
increases the penalty substantially. Battery is a Class A misdemeanor punishable
by up to one year in prison. § 12-3(b). Aggravated battery using a firearm occurs
when T discharges a firearm and causes injury to V. § 12-3.05(e)(1). This elevates
the crime to a Class X felony (6-30 years), where the penalty also varies with other
factors, such as the identity of the victim.
Note that even if the threat described in the text rarely yields a profit to the
wrongdoer, it is correspondingly inexpensive to impose. One weapon can be
waved many times until a vulnerable target submits. The same is not true for a
12
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noise you are all making; I hate you; if you don’t shut up I’m going
to come back and make you sorry.” In normal circumstances, this
threat is nonspecific both because it is aimed at a vaguely described
group, so that no one has particular reason to fear for his or her own
safety, and because it is equivocal in terms of timing and method.
This lack of specificity is apt to make a criminal conviction
impossible as a matter of law. 20 Without specificity, behavior may be
regarded as wicked – but it is often not criminal until there is
execution; at the very least, some significant and active step is
required in order to find that an attempted crime has been committed.
There are conventional explanations for this difference between
specific and general threats. The exclusion of the latter from the
reach of criminal law is, for one thing, a convenient way of saying
that loose and angry talk should not normally be criminalized. 21 It
may be sufficiently common for people to say things in fits of anger
that there is a general understanding that those who say ugly things
when enraged, or under the influence of alcohol, do not have the
intent required to trigger criminal penalties. Experience may have
shown that only a very few of these general threats are harbingers of
their execution, which is to say violence, whereas a much higher
fraction of specific threats turns out to predict just what the
threatener promised. At the same time, or perhaps equivalently, most
listeners are accustomed to angry words that amount to nothing
dangerous, or otherwise have no reason to be apprehensive when at
the receiving end of such a threat. Rather than chilling speech or
leaving an enormous pool of cases to prosecutorial discretion or
juries’ inclinations, law requires specificity. A companion argument
is that where general threats are concerned, it is more difficult to

beneficial promise, which in some ways is the mirror image of a threat, and it is
interesting that law has experimented with formalities and suits for dashed
expectations primarily where promisors can be promiscuous, as with charitable
gifts or expressions of intentions to marry. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit
De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and Multiplication Effects, 26 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 365
(2010).
20
See Glenda K. Harnad, Robert F. Koets, & William Lindsley, Terrorim and
Threats—Threat to Commit Crime Which Will Cause Death or Great Bodily
Injury, 19 Cal. Jur. 3d (2015) (“Unequivocality, unconditionality, immediacy, and
specificity are not absolutely mandated but must be sufficiently present in the
threat and surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and immediate
prospect of execution to the victim”).
21
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2000) (explaining that the state can only
punish threatening expression when the speaker “means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals”).
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prove both intent and reasonable apprehension. 22 This latter
explanation is more attractive because it is hard to see why speech
directed at a specific individual, or simply containing sufficient
details to qualify as a specific threat, does not enjoy as much
protection as speech that is more vague or is aimed at a dispersed
group.
There is no reason to dispute this conventional understanding of
general and specific threats, but especially when the threat is general
because it was directed at a group of people, it is not obviously
correct and it does not appear to reflect a social welfare calculus.
Within limits, the larger the group that is threatened, the greater the
aggregate disutility, even if each person in the group has a small
chance of becoming a victim. One who threatens a group usually
creates more anxiety and likely stimulates more total precautiontaking than does one who threatens a specific person. For example,
someone who threatens a shooting on a vaguely specified college
campus may create sufficient anxiety to shut down a campus for a
day. The anxiety and shutdown costs are great, even if no individual
feels particularly threatened. 23 The requirement of reasonable
apprehension seems sensible enough, but there is no reason to expect
that apprehension is more reasonable as the threat is addressed to a
specific individual. In any event, general threats do not all get a free
pass. Law can and does criminalize group threats in piecemeal
fashion. If, for example, there is a spate of school shootings, a
legislature might make it a crime to threaten the use of a weapon or
to bring a weapon onto school grounds. 24 Schoolchildren and their
parents might have reason to grow anxious about threats made
against an entire school, but the legislature can respond to their
apprehensions about such a general threat, without directly removing

22

Put differently, if intent is important in criminal law, perhaps because it helps
show that an injury was not accidental, then in turn an earlier, specific threat
clarifies intent. Law-and-economics struggles with the intent requirement and often
avoids the treatment of threats. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory
of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1214-19, 1221-22 (1985)
(rationalizing the treatment of attempts, struggling with intent, and avoiding
threats).
23
http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/university-of-chicago-cancels-classes-afterfbi-warns-of-gun-threat/
24
Without such a statute, the remedies are limited. See, e.g., Bolden v. Chartiers
Valley Sch. Dist., 869 A.2d 1134 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (finding that employee’s
bringing loaded gun onto school property constituted neglect of duty, and the lying
and hindering a lawful investigation initiated by the superintendent gave the
district authority to take disciplinary action against employee).
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the requirement of a specific threat from the law of threats per se. 25
The distinction between general and specific threats, and the
inclination to leave many of the former unsanctioned may reflect an
intuition about marginal deterrence. Marginal deterrence theory
offers a means of drawing or understanding the line between specific
and general threats that does not require any judgment about the
value of one kind of speech or another, and that does not
underestimate the harm imposed by a general threat.
B. Specific Threats and Marginal Deterrence Theory
The offender who points a gun at a pedestrian and says “Your
wallet or your life,” presents law with the archetypal question of how
much punishment to attach to the threat and then how much to leave
for a completed crime, in this case a shooting. An important
assumption here is that there is some ceiling to the penalty, or
binding constraint on enforcement, so that the punishment for the
threat cannot simply be x, for the shooting y, and for both, x+y, as
then there would be no reduction in marginal deterrence as x is
increased. 26 Assume for the moment that law can solve this problem,
by simply reaching a reasonable balance between the threat and the

25

As law criminalizes various general threats, albeit by assigning these threats to
new categories, like weapons violations or online crimes, the distinction between
specific and general threats becomes formalistic. On the other hand, these
legislative moves against various general threats mirror or confirm an analogy
between general and specific threats, on the one hand, and tort actions and public
nuisance, on the other. In the tort context, individual plaintiffs have standing to
complain of a private nuisance, as in the case of a polluting factory next door, but
where a public, larger-scale, nuisance is concerned – though it might be more
harmful – the resolution of conflicting uses is left to the legislature See Keith N.
Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the New Enforcement Actions,
18 S. CT. ECON. REV. 43 (2010) (discussing tradeoff between public and private
enforcement). One rationale is that individual plaintiffs might have the wrong
incentives when it comes to bringing or settling such claims. Similarly, in the
criminal law, the more general the threat, the more it is poorly assessed by an
individual or by a jury’s assessment of the reasonableness of various individuals’
fears. In turn, these are often settings where the legal system expects police or
other authorities to keep the peace, dissipate any significant threats, and then
proceed with a specialized criminal statute aimed at reckless endangerment,
weapons violations, terrorism, or other categories that serve to circumvent the
specificity requirement of the statute addressing criminal threats.
26
We assume away the likelihood of decreasing marginal disutility of punishment.
In other words, y might provide more marginal deterrence when it is unattached to
x because the offender fears the first units of punishment much more than later
ones. We set this aside not only because potential offenders are likely to be
heterogeneous, but also because the shape of the disutility function matters little to
our argument.
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completed shooting. It attaches a more modest punishment to the
criminal threat, than that suggested by the proportionality principle
alone, in order to leave space for a large enough marginal deterrent
on the (threatened) shooting. Marginal deterrence theory is easily
incorporated into law, and there is certainly no reason to assume that
it is ignored by lawmakers. It is easy to imagine, for example, that
the armed robber who threatens a pedestrian with his words and a
drawn weapon can expect a 3-year prison term if apprehended and
convicted; a 5-year sentence if he also steals the victim’s wallet and
runs off; a 10-year term if he shoots and maims the victim; and a 30year term if he kills the victim. Other steps, and associated numbers,
can be inserted all the way up.
To be sure, a marginal deterrence theorist might say that three
(years) is too big a number for the first of these wrongs, because
more (than two additional years’) deterrence should have been
reserved to discourage the taking of the wallet, but any such
argument about the increments is empirical, difficult to resolve in the
face of heterogeneous criminals who can change behavior over time,
and perhaps wrong. 27 The discussion here assumes, optimistically
and for the sake of exposition, that the numbers provided by existing
law already reflect careful thinking about marginal deterrence.
Consider now the case of a general threat. Suppose an offender
says to a group of partygoers: “Quiet down, or I am going to come
back and make you sorry.” A useful and novel way to think about
why this general threat is not criminalized, is that, first, the general
threat need not cause anxiety or any harm on its own and therefore
deterring the threat as such is not so important, and, second, because
the details of any subsequent step are unknown and addressed to
many people, law reserves its deterrents. The threatener has not said
what he will do next, or to whom, and he has by assumption caused
no physical or personal injury by the time he is detained. He may
have become sober and calm, or he may have returned to find that
the partygoers dispersed because of his threat, called the police, or
readied themselves for his violent return. In the absence of good
information about these later steps, it is perhaps clever to attach no
penalty to the first step, the initial broad threat, in order to reserve
deterrence for the subsequent steps, including attempted crimes. In
this way, the distinction between specific and general threats can be

27

At the risk of repetition, see Friedman & Sjostrom, supra note 3, for special
cases and assumptions where the marginal deterrence (quick) intuition is called
into question.
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understood through marginal deterrence theory. 28
C. Marginal Deterrence Followed by a Substitution Effect
How should theory influence the structure of criminal penalties?
Assume that a starting point in the design of criminal law and
penalties is the proportionality principle; the more severe the crime,
the greater the penalty. 29 Assessments of severity might derive from
straightforward deterrence calculations, retribution considerations,
incarceration costs, and political pressure. This design principle
yields a baseline, or schedule of crimes and penalties. Imagine that
along this schedule, theft from a person is assigned a penalty of 1
year imprisonment; armed robbery, perhaps included in the category
of aggravated assault, is assigned 10 years; and armed robbery that
includes a shooting in which someone is injured, sometimes known
as aggravated battery, draws a penalty of 20 years. 30 For quick
reference we might summarize this part of the schedule as TH-1/AA-

28
It is tempting to add in the idea that this threatener of noisy partygoers is not
credible, so that he imposes little anxiety and is in fact unlikely to pose much of a
risk. One reason to doubt credibility is that the threatener has announced his plan,
though not with specificity, and he can expect that defensive measures will be in
place when he returns. But this is even more so if the threat is specific, as in “Quiet
down or I will return in two hours and kill the bartender.” A specific threat of this
kind is more likely to trigger defensive measures and, in turn, execution seems less
likely if the offender is rational. If the threatener warns the partygoers: “Get quiet
right now or I will make you all sorry” the threat is incredible either because the
threatener is outnumbered or because if he threatens to return with a weapon, there
is time to mount a defense or call the police.
29
Jeremy Bentham, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 142 (1789) ("The greater the mischief of the offense, the greater is
the expense, which it maybe worth while to be at, in the way of punishment.");
Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 258-274 (9th ed. 2014)
(discussing the elements of an efficient criminal law and noting that much follows
from the infeasibility of setting punishments high enough to achieve 100%
deterrence).
30
The penalties are usually given in the form of ranges, so that aggravated battery
with a firearm in Illinois, for instance, is a Class X felony, assigned 6-30 years.
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-4.2(a)(1). The same is true for theft, with penalties
usually rising according to the value taken as well as whether the theft was from
another person (as opposed to a store shelf, for example). In Illinois, the range is
from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 3 felony, and could generate a fine or a
prison term. The mean penalty is probably between one and two years if the theft is
from a person. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/16-1(b)(1). The crimes and penalties used
in the text are thus illustrative and show what the schedule would look like before
further consideration of marginal deterrence, substitution, and the credibility effect
described presently.

17

NEW DIMENSIONS IN CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

10/AB-20, where AB-20, for example, means that aggravated battery
is associated with a 20-year penalty. 31
Marginal deterrence theory suggests that the legislature think
carefully about the differential, or gap, between two crimes,
wherever the offender is likely to be in a position to escalate from
one crime to another. It might suggest that if the proportionality
principle alone produces a 10-year gap between the two serious
felonies on this schedule, it would be advisable to widen the gap, in
order to discourage the criminal from shooting his victim, as he
might be tempted to do in order to gain property or eliminate a
witness so as to escape apprehension. The legislature can do this by
increasing the penalty on the more serious crime, producing a
schedule such as TH-1/AA-10/AB-25, but this strategy quickly runs
into a ceiling. The ceiling has at least two sources. First, the criminal
does not expect an infinitely long life, so a stretched-out schedule
like TH-1/AA-35/AB-95 is unlikely to produce any more marginal
deterrence than does TH-1/AA-35/AB-50. Moreover, lawmakers will
have prison conditions and prison construction costs in mind, so that
widening the gap by pushing higher (and then pushing the penalty
for maiming three witnesses yet higher) is a strategy with limits. The
alternative is to widen the gap by lowering the penalty for the less
severe crime. The analysis is not weakened by an assumption that the
ceiling has been reached at AB-25, with 30 years reserved for murder
perhaps, so that the way to further deter the armed robber from
shooting is to lower the penalty for armed robbery alone. Perhaps
TH-1/AA-10/AB-25 becomes TH-1/AA-5/AB-25, so that there is a
significant deterrent to pulling the trigger, even if we are constrained
by a ceiling and hold constant the probability of apprehension. 32 In
some cases, this large gap is politically or even morally impossible.
31

TH refers of course to theft from a person, and AA to aggravated assault, here
the armed robbery with no discharge of the weapon.
For simplicity, the example continues to assume that aggravated battery produces a
sanction that is not added to the sanction for the aggravated assault, which will
usually precede the battery. In Section II.B the two sanctions were not summed
because of the ceiling on the system’s ability to penalize. There is also a doctrinal
reason for not summing the sanctions; the criminal charge of aggravated battery
will include the lesser charge of aggravated assault, and in most jurisdictions there
will be circumstances in which one or the other must therefore be chosen. See
Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 351 (2005).
32
Most of the examples in the text assume a constant rate of apprehension. In
reality, the gap between penalties usually understates marginal deterrence because
the offender knows that the more serious crime will attract more police
investigation. On the other hand, a more violent offender may scare away or even
eliminate witnesses.
18
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If the middle crime is especially heinous, as in the case of rape,
marginal deterrence may simply be sacrificed in the interest of
proportionality. Where armed robbery is concerned, however, the
1/5/25 schedule may be acceptable.
Note that the gap between theft and armed robbery narrows
as the gap between armed robbery and aggravated battery
increases, 33 and a thoughtful legislator might fear that thieves, as
mundane as pickpockets, will now arm themselves and sometimes do
great harm. 34 Given the ceiling, no gap can be widened without
narrowing another. Fortunately, it is unlikely that offenders will
easily substitute from pickpocketing or other thievery to armed
robbery. They certainly will not do so on the spot. If marginal
deterrence is about influencing an offender in the midst of a crime,
the TH/AA gap is obviously less important than the AA/AB gap.
Moreover, many pickpockets are expert in their trade and would not
readily shift to armed robbery; other, amateur thieves have no ready
access to firearms. The most serious design problem is where a
narrow gap might induce substitution toward more serious
wrongdoing. 35
The legislature’s major problem is that this substitution effect
contradicts the influence of marginal deterrence theory. If the
schedule is adjusted to TH-1/AA-5/AB-25, there is the danger that
armed robbery will become newly attractive to offenders. It may well
cause a few criminals who are inclined to shoot to do less of that, but
then to commit many more armed robberies, as most of them plan to
leave their non-submitting victims unharmed. More important,
criminal activity may increase because armed robbery (sans
shooting) is now under-deterred. Its ideal penalty of 10 was
decreased to 5 in order to widen the AA/AB gap, and discourage
shootings, but this move in support of marginal deterrence leaves an
33

The punishment for theft depends on the value taken and whether T is a repeat
offender. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/16-1(b)(1). There are many different grades that
increase the penalty. For example, if T steals property valued less than $10,000, it
is a class 3 felony punishable by 2-5 years imprisonment and fines up to $25,000.
Robbery, however, is a Class 2 felony punishable by 3-7 years, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
§5/18-1(c). The crime rises to Aggravated Robbery if T threatens with a weapon
(even if he is lying about that fact), a Class 1 felony (4-15 years). §5/18-1(c).
The punishment for Armed Robbery depends on whether the criminal is armed
with a dangerous weapon (Class X, 6-30 years), a gun (6-30 years + 15 years),
discharges a firearm (6-30 years + 20 years), or shoots the victim (6-30 years + 25
years). 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/18-2(b).
34
The argument works best if these offenders underestimate the harm they will do
with weapons.
35
Friedman & Sjostrom, supra note 3 (considering the two-crime cases as well as
substitutions among more options).
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insufficient deterrent for the less serious of the two crimes, and there
will be substitution in its favor. The first two dimensions of criminal
deterrence are thus at odds with one another.
The important lesson here is that law needs to focus on
substitution as well as escalation. It may for example be sensible to
increase the penalties for both theft and armed robbery, because
criminals previously inclined to rob and shoot may now be likely to
commit a few more armed robberies – in the course of which they
are less inclined to shoot – but also to find mere theft, or even
pickpocketing, more attractive. 36 In addition, other offenders may
migrate to armed robbery because its penalty has been decreased.
Taking these effects into account, the new schedule should perhaps
be TH-2/AA-8/AB-25. Some of the marginal deterrence is sacrificed
in order to make armed robbery (AA) and even theft less attractive,
but there is no reason to expect that the optimal schedule is a return
to TH-1/AA-10/AB-25. In fact, the typical schedule of penalties
dramatically widens the gap to discourage the use of a firearm, and is
left with fewer years to discourage the deployment of the firearm. 37
This is probably well-intentioned but mistaken, and there ought to be
experimentation with a wider gap between the two serious crimes.
In some settings there is probably no substitution of any kind. 38
Consider a plagiarist in a university community. If the penalty for a
student’s plagiarism were severe, it would be unlikely that plagiarists
would think they had little to lose by stepping up to transcript forgery
36

Imagine that armed robberies, like most opportunities, are available to a given
offender with a declining marginal productivity. The offender expects to gain 100
from the first, 95 from the second, and so forth, and has chosen to commit x armed
robberies. The expected marginal product includes the risk of apprehension and the
penalty for the crime. If law now increases the AA/AB gap, by raising the penalty
for aggravated battery, then on the margin the offender will shoot less often and
perhaps be prepared to commit more aggravated assaults without escalating to
battery, in the event that the victim does not submit. But the marginal productivity
of armed robberies will fall, and mere thievery may also become an attractive
option, as it is now the offender’s best or second best line of work, inasmuch as
armed robbery – with some probability of aggravated battery – is now less
profitable.
37
While using a gun greatly increases the penalty for armed robbery (6-30 years +
15 years), only 5 years is added for discharging the firearm and another 5 years for
actually maiming or killing the victim. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/18-2(b).
38
Marginal deterrence is more straightforward where promises rather than threats
are concerned, because substitution is unlikely. Thus, if a party to a contract hints
at a coming breach, or breaches in a minor way in order to secure some benefit at
the other party’s expense, the law might or might not provide a remedy. If it does
provide a remedy, then it deters the minor breach and threat, and it leaves less of a
remedy to secure the larger project. But it is unlikely that a smaller penalty for the
first breach changes the level of contractual activity.
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or the theft of rare books from the university library. The
wrongdoing in question is fairly self-contained if only because the
skill required for plagiarism does not help with the more serious
crimes. Plagiarism may be like pickpocketing in this regard.
Similarly, if the gap between sexual harassment and sexual assault
on campus is increased by reducing the penalty for the former, in
order to improve marginal deterrence with respect to assault, it is
improbable that plagiarists would switch to sexual harassment. If,
however, there is a risk of increased sexual harassment because
previously well-behaved students will now become harassers, given
the low penalty attached to that wrong, then it is risky to widen the
gap between harassment and assault by lowering the penalty attached
to the former. 39
The offender who waves a gun while demanding a wallet can
easily escalate to violence and aggravated battery. But because there
is easy substitution back down towards mere threats and theft,
reducing the penalties for, or even decriminalizing, threats may seem
pointless. Reform in the direction of decriminalization may increase
marginal deterrence for the more serious and violent crime, but
people will gravitate toward threat-making if they believe they can
often enough get what they want simply by threatening. But there is
more to the problem than this tradeoff in two dimensions. In the next
Section we introduce a third dimension and explain why a low
sanction makes threats less credible because of the improved
marginal deterrence; counterintuitively, these threats become less
attractive to the offender. By lowering or even eliminating the
sanction attached to threats, law can increase marginal deterrence
without risking much substitution to the lower-level wrong of threatmaking.
D. The Credibility Effect
1. Primary Credibility
If a rational or experienced criminal is often influenced by the
gaps between penalties for crimes of different severity, then it is
quite likely that he is also affected by his perception of his victim’s
regard for various threats. 40 If V finds a threat especially credible,
because V knows that T faces very little additional punishment by
39

And of course a better approach might be to widen the gap by increasing the
penalty for assault, unless that is precluded by a ceiling formed by the university’s
capacity to punish without criminal law’s protections and the involvement of the
state.
40
Cf. supra Section I.A.
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executing the threat T has visited upon V, then T will be more likely
to make such a threat in the first place. 41 Correspondingly, when V
finds a threat much less credible, because V knows that if T executes
T faces a much greater punishment than if T does not, V will often
refuse to submit. 42 In turn, because V will submit less often, T will
be less likely to issue the threat in the first place – unless of course
the penalty for the threat alone is so slight that T loses little by
testing V. This is the heart of the primary credibility effect. 43
Even where offenders can move fluidly from a threat to its
execution, as they often can between aggravated assault and
aggravated battery, the wider gap suggested by marginal deterrence
theory has a powerful impact on the credibility of the threat – and
this in turn decreases the amount of substitution to the threat. Note
that the primary credibility effect is the third element to be
considered in scheduling sanctions, but it is relevant only where one
wrong amounts to a threat of completing a more serious wrong. The
dimension of direct deterrence, reflected in the potential substitution
to crimes with lesser penalties, never disappears because there will
always be offenders who try to extract something from victims if
they can threaten these victims at low cost. Even where the
credibility of such threats is very low, some sanction is sensible, both
because the threats impose anxiety and because some victims will
submit. Still, the primary credibility effect should encourage law to
attach low sanctions to threats; doing so will create a larger gap and
more marginal deterrence with respect to the more serious wrong of
execution and, at the same time, it is likely to reduce threat-making.
The idea is that there will be little substitution towards threats
because the increased marginal deterrence reduces their credibility
and profitability.
Both marginal deterrence and the primary credibility effect are a
function of the gap between the expected punishment for the threat
and the punishment for the more serious crime, but they are hardly
the same thing. Marginal deterrence is about the offender’s incentive
to escalate from one wrong to another, as from AA to AB in our
schedule. It is about T’s calculation of the net cost of executing his

41

Cf. supra Sections I.A-B.
Cf. supra Sections I.A-B.
43
It might of course be called the Incredibility Effect, because the idea is to use
law and marginal deterrence to make offenders’ threats less credible, but following
convention we call it the credibility effect, as it is about credibility. The first (and
only one, to the best of our knowledge) to point to what we call the credibility
effect is Uri Weiss, The Robber Asks to be Punished, available at
http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/node/2834 (2015) (PhD dissertation in Hebrew).
42
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threat, once he has issued the threat. In contrast, the primary
credibility effect concerns T’s incentive to issue the threat in the first
place. It is derived from the probability of extracting a gain from V at
either the first (threat) or second (violence) step, and thus from T’s
view of V’s perception of the credibility of the threat. The primary
credibility effect comes out of a dynamic analysis of threats.
Marginal deterrence looks only to T’s incentives and regards V as a
passive player in the interaction. The substitution effect is somewhat
dynamic in that it looks not only at T’s responses to the schedule of
punishments, but also to other, potential offenders’ inclinations to
engage in criminal activity. The primary credibility effect is yet more
dynamic because it adds in the victim’s perspective, in the form of
V’s inclination to submit given the credibility of T’s threat;
moreover, it follows through by examining T’s incentive to engage
in threat-making in the first place, given V’s likely response. For this
reason, the primary credibility effect can be described as offering an
ex ante perspective, while marginal deterrence operates not quite ex
post, but ex medio, after the threat but before execution. 44
The primary credibility effect can be understood as resolving the
tension between marginal deterrence and the substitution effect. The
former suggested a large AA/AB gap, for example, while the latter
pushes in the other direction because offenders will substitute toward
the lower-sanctioned wrong, AA. How do we know there is a net
gain from increasing the gap? The primary credibility effect assures
that the large gap is a good thing; by raising the cost of execution, it
devalues the threat, or AA, itself. In the end, there will be little
substitution towards something that is unlikely to bring about
submission.

44

Imagine, almost as in Part I, that the sanction for a threat is 8, or alternatively 1,
and that the sanction attached to execution of the threat is 20. Marginal deterrence
is of course greater with the sanction of 1 for the threat. The gap between threat
and execution is 19, or alternatively 12. An offender who conveys a threat is
presumably less likely to follow through and execute when the gap is greater. In
contrast, the credibility effect focuses on the notion that the victim is less likely to
submit when the sanction for the threat is 1, and the offender is more likely
deterred. This makes threat-making a less attractive activity to offenders, and there
may actually be fewer threats because the sanction of 1 is perceived as costly given
the fact that threats will rarely succeed. Meanwhile, if the sanction for the threat
were 8, victims might be expected to submit with regularity because they know
that unsatisfied threateners do not lose terribly much by proceeding with execution.
If so, there will be more substitution to threat-making when there is a higher
sanction attached to it. Counterintuitively, the 8/20 schedule might attract more
criminals than the 1/20 schedule, and this is especially so if 19 deters the greater
wrong and 12 is inadequate for this task.
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2. Secondary Credibility
As we explained in Part I, a threat is credible if the victim
believes escalation to be likely in the event of nonsubmission. But it
is secondarily credible the more V trusts T not to renew or execute
the threat following V’s submission. T wants V to believe that the
threat is both primarily and secondarily credible, but low execution
costs normally raise the probability of the first effect while lowering
the likelihood of the second effect; low execution costs lead V to fear
that submission will be followed by execution or another threat. If V
submits, it is because V reasons that, once T obtains his property, T
gains little from continuing violently.
Properly calibrated penalties can decrease both primary and
secondary credibility, and make threats even less valuable. We have
already shown that law can decrease primary credibility by lowering
the sanction for threats and increasing the gap between the sanctions
for a threat and its execution. This may well be enough for most
legislatures, but it is possible that law can do yet better by also
decreasing secondary credibility. The counter-intuitive, and
admittedly risky, strategy is to make the sanction for execution (or
renewal of the threat) following submission low – perhaps even very
low. If the sanction for post-submission execution (or threat renewal)
is low, secondary credibility will be low. V will know that
submission is especially unwise because execution or renewal of the
threat might well follow. In turn, T will see that V’s submission is
even less likely. The proposed legal strategy is unusual, to say the
least. Ideally, threats will be reduced because the high AA/AB gap
makes the threat incredible inasmuch as execution costs are high so
long as there is a significant probability of T’s apprehension. But if T
threatens anyway, and V contemplates submission, the idea is to
show V that submission might not satisfy T. If V is often convinced
and does not submit, then in turn T will find threats even less
profitable. In short, a wide AA/AB gap should convince V that T
would not execute (as primary credibility is low). But when V,
nevertheless, submits, it might be clever for the sanction for
escalation to be low in order to weaken T’s secondary credibility.
The idea, again, is for T to see that V is unlikely to submit in the first
place.
The potential for this unusual deterrence strategy is most
apparent in a case like blackmail, where the victim has time to
consider whether or not to submit to the wrongdoer’s threat. V must
fear that if she submits and pays T, T will simply repeat the threat.
Imagine now that law penalizes blackmail but provides no penalty
whatsoever for a repeated blackmail. V will know that T loses
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nothing by repeating his threat (setting aside some increased chance
of apprehension) and, in turn, V might now choose not to submit in
the first round because the risk of repeated blackmail, with no end to
required payments, convinces V to stand up to T in the first place. It
is even possible that law could provide a substantial penalty for onetime blackmail, but provide that if a victim submits, then the victim
is guilty of a crime or, more palatably, that the blackmailer is
completely free of criminal liability once the victim submits to his
threat. Again, the idea is to discourage submission by V, so that
blackmailers will find their craft unprofitable.
When a victim is in terrible fear and must act quickly, it is
unlikely that a strategy aimed at reducing secondary credibility will
work and, in any event, it is probably too fraught for legislative
experimentation. Consider the rapist who threatens to maim or kill V,
if she does not submit. Law might focus virtually all of its deterrence
at step one, so that aggravated criminal sexual assault is associated
with a penalty of 28, increased to 29 in a case where a weapon is
discharged or the victim is beaten, and then 30 (the presumed
ceiling) for rape-murder. Current law more closely resembles a
10/20/30 schedule, which aims to deter escalation by the rapist – but
at the expense of some low deterrence at the first step. In theory, an
advantage of the 28/29/30 schedule is that it makes the threatener’s
implicit promise not to further injure the victim less plausible
because the rapist does not face a significantly greater penalty in the
event of escalation. But the implication is that law wants to
encourage the victim to resist, and even if it were somehow true that
broad resistance would decrease the incidence of rape, the cost is too
great to contemplate, and the likelihood that victims can engage in
cool calculations while being assaulted is low. Law might just as
well tell the victims of a hijacked plane that they and their families
will be unable to collect any damages unless they battle the hijacker
to the death. It is possible that this sort of schedule of penalties for
hijacking (15/25 – but then 0 in the event of submission) would
discourage hijackers, but it would do so by sacrificing the lives of
some victims. Such strategies seem more appropriate for trained
military units than for civilians.
Returning to the earlier example of assaults aimed at gaining
property, law can weaken T’s secondary credibility by promising
very little additional punishment to the criminal who uses violence
following a victim’s submission to an aggravated assault. If we
imagine V to be a storekeeper, then it is plausible that V has thought
about armed robbery in advance and, if V knows that law provides
only a small gap between aggravated assault that ends in a property
transfer, AATH, and aggravated battery, AB, V may decide not to
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submit to an armed robber’s threat. A narrow AATH/AB gap
encourages V to disbelieve T’s threat. In turn, an experienced T may
be less likely to threaten in the first place. The legal strategy
reflected in the narrow gap is risky because T might be tempted to
escalate his crime at low cost in order to lower the risk of
apprehension. If so, high marginal deterrence at the point of violence
remains important. But it is plausible that the better goal is to reduce
threats in the first place, because these are the offender’s high-profit
crimes. If so, the strategy of diminishing T’s secondary credibility by
narrowing the AATH/AB gap is inviting. 45 On the other hand, if the
most important thing is to deter violence, then the AATH/AB gap
must be large.
E. Summary
Return now to our illustration where marginal deterrence
considerations altered the initial schedule based on proportionality,
and all that it might reflect, from TH-1/AA-10/AB-20 to TH-1/AA5/AB-25. The substitution effect then modified this result to TH2/AA-8/AB-25. 46 The primary credibility effect could surely nudge
this back to TH-2/AA-6/AB-25, but a more interesting—if rather
extreme—possibility is TH-2/AA-3/AB-25. Marginal deterrence
matters where the second gap is concerned and, given the ceiling of
25 years for anything short of murder, deterrence is maximized if the
penalty for AA, in this case armed robbery with no shooting, is about
the same as that for theft without a weapon or threat. 47 The idea is to
45
The legislature can decide separately whether the narrow gap should be at the
low end, as with TH-2/AATH-4/AB-5, or at the high end, with TH-2/AATH24/AB-25.
46
Of course, as conceded in the discussion supra Section II.C., it is possible that
the marginal deterrence and substitution elements are perfectly offsetting, in which
case AA-10/AB-25 is as good a guess as any for the optimal schedule. Recall that
AB-20 increased to AB-25 to reflect marginal deterrence and the likely ceiling on
penalties. TH-1 was modified to TH-2 in response to the substitution effect. The
assumption of virtually no substitution between theft, or at least pickpocketing, and
armed robbery, means that the narrowing of the gap between TH and AA presents
no danger. Finally, pickpocketing is not itself a threat of armed robbery or worse,
in the way that armed robbery is a threat of a shooting, so the credibility effect
does not come into play, and TH-2 remains even as the AA/AB gap is adjusted to
take account of the credibility effect.
47
A more complete analysis should take both submission and non-submission into
account. When T threatens with AA, there are several possibilities: (1) V does not
submit, in which case T either (1a) withdraws (a sequence we might call AAW) or
(1b) escalates to AB. A large AA/AB gap is desirable to encourage (1a) rather than
(1b). (2) V does submit, in which case T succeeds in gaining V’s property
(reflected in the sequence AATH), and then T either (2a) departs or (2b) proves
secondarily unreliable and actually executes anyway (or repeats the threat). In this

26

NEW DIMENSIONS IN CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

think beyond marginal deterrence to the danger of substitution to
armed robbery. The driving force is primary credibility, and the
incorporation of the victim’s perspective. The greater the AA/AB
gap, the less credible is T’s threat because T is well deterred from
executing on his threat – and the less attractive it will be for T, or any
other offenders, to ply this threat. In turn, where it is most plausible
that V and T have time to consider one another’s incentives and
responses, secondary credibility becomes more important, and a
small sanction for execution after submission (or for rethreatening) is
justified or, at least, deserves experimentation.
In reality it is convenient to attach some extra penalty to a threat
like AA, whether or not escalation follows. One reason is that if there
is no marginal sanction at all, there will be too much opportunistic
substitution, as offenders will simply have nothing to lose by
threatening victims and hoping that some submit despite the
incredible threats. Second, there is the political reality that victims
will demand some punishment for their offenders. A third reason for
some sanction concerns the practicalities of law enforcement. A
criminal who is apprehended in the course of an aggravated battery
will insist that as long as his crime was not completed, he should not
be punished – and especially so if he did not even take the victim’s
property. There is too fine a line between armed robbery and “armed
robbery with an attempted shooting” to rely upon. 48 Moreover, it
would be costly and unacceptable to encourage police to delay
apprehending repeat criminals in order to give the latter a chance to
case, as discussed in the text, a large gap with respect to AATH/AB is good for
discouraging (2b), but a small gap might be a remarkable way of defeating
secondary credibility, and discouraging the threat, AA, in the first place. For
example, if V submits, a schedule of AATH-4/AB-25 works to deter violence,
while AATH-4/AB-5 discourages submission in the first place by sacrificing
marginal deterrence. This is the critical choice for the legislature. The more it
wants to influence V to join in crime fighting, the more a small gap might be used
to reduce T’s secondary credibility and thus encourage V’s resistance. It is
plausible that this choice depends on the legislature’s choices regarding gun
control. In a state where lawmakers believe they are fighting crime by allowing or
encouraging storekeepers to arm themselves, the law presumably wants the
storekeeper to resist in the TH/AA/AB scenario. It is even plausible that the
structure of criminal sanctions should depend on whether the victim is armed.
48
Put differently, assault is normally thought of as attempted battery. At the same
time, law often punishes attempts in order to have a remedy in place when a
criminal is apprehended just before completing his intended crime. It is this
function of the law of attempts that is unintentionally sacrificed when threats are
completely decriminalized. One solution is to lower the penalty for threats, but not
to go too far; in the text’s example, TH-2/AA-6/AB-25 represents this position.
Another is to classify threats, or aggravated assaults (with no battery), as the
lowest class of felony or as a misdemeanor. AA-3 represents this solution.
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maim their victims so that they can be put away for 25 years.
The point of this Article is obviously not to draft a detailed
criminal code but, for illustrative purposes, it is useful to settle on
TH-2/AA-3/AB-25 as the schedule indicated by the combination of
the proportionality principle, marginal deterrence, the substitution
effect and, finally, the primary credibility effect. The penalty of 3
gives police a tool for apprehending a criminal just before a shooting,
when there is a good chance that a threat has been issued. The low,
but non-zero, sanction reflects the arguments and realities just
described. And when secondary credibility seems relevant, law can
experiment with a small sanction for escalation following
submission.
III. REVERSING THE CREDIBILITY EFFECT BY SINKING COSTS
A. The Sunk Cost Strategy
Marginal deterrence theory points to the danger of law’s
attaching a significant penalty to behavior that leads up to a serious
crime. In the case of a threat and the danger of its subsequent
execution, the credibility effect is itself a function of marginal
deterrence. It diminishes the value of threats to offenders. One way
to think about the ex ante and ex medio perspectives is to describe
the penalty that law attaches to a threat as a sunk cost. Once T brings
on this sunk cost by threatening V, the sunk cost is irrelevant for
marginal decision-making, and what matters is the expected penalty
for escalation. The argument for lowering the sanction attached to
threats is thus a way of undoing T’s ability to sink costs, and using
the available deterrent to discourage execution and, in turn, make T’s
threat less credible in the first place. 49
49

For an example that includes execution costs in addition to expected legal
penalties, imagine that T threatens to harm V unless the latter transfers property
worth 9. Suppose further that the expected cost to T, in the form of a legal penalty,
is 10 for the crime he threatens to execute, and 4 simply for threatening the crime.
Apart from these legal penalties, T’s costs are very low, perhaps 1 for cornering V
and issuing the threat and then another 2 for executing it. T will gain the property
worth 9 either by coerced transfer or by taking it after he harms V. Criminal
activity of this sort is highly profitable in the absence of law. T threatens V,
spending 1 to gain 9, and V finds the threat credible. Even when “forced” to
execute, T spends another 2, and a total of 3, to gain 9. But once law imposes
penalties of 4 for a threat and 10 for the (threat plus) completed crime, the criminal
activity is unprofitable unless the victim often submits to the threat alone. At the
point of threat, the marginal penalty for execution is 10 minus 4, or 6, and when
added to the execution cost of 2, it pays for T to proceed in order to gain 9. If the
threat alone is not penalized, and the entire 10 is still attached to the completed
crime, then T faces a cost of 10 plus 2, and crime does not pay. When it penalizes
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The sunk cost perspective suggests that even when all legal
penalties are reserved for the final step, or law is simply out of the
picture, T can enhance credibility by sinking execution costs. 50
Remarkably, this can be so even where it would seem that no
credible threat is possible. The offender can sink costs, or stage the
process of criminal wrongdoing, until it becomes credible that he
will complete the crime. It is conceivable that V will foresee T’s
staging strategy and decide to submit even before T does much
sinking of costs. This staging by T essentially reverses the credibility
effect. Section II.D developed the idea that greater marginal
deterrence for execution makes the earlier threat less credible, so that
offenders are less attracted to threat-making because victims are less
likely to be submissive. Here the idea is that T can do the reverse; T
engages in a kind of “homemade credibility effect,” sinking costs in
order to reduce the marginal cost of execution. This will enhance
credibility (viewed from V’s perspective), and make submission by
V more likely. T will in this way increase the profitability of his
threat. 51
threats, law thus creates sunk costs and makes the completed crime – and thus the
threat – more credible.
50
For an insightful analysis in one specific setting, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A
New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1996) (suggesting that negative value suits exist because the defendant
knows that the plaintiff can proceed in stages, spending some resources in the first
stage, and credibly threatening to spend more in the next, so that the suit can be
credible even without actual expenditures). Note that Bebchuk assumes that the
parties cannot affect the total costs of litigation or the expected value of the suit.
The parties are also assumed to be capable of settling at any stage. We assume that
settlement is not an option but instead that the threatener either gains all or gains
nothing.
51
For an application of the idea advanced here about multi-staging to settlements,
including a discussion of dividing surpluses, see William H. J. Hubbard, The
Fourfold Credibility Problem in Law and War (available manuscript). Although
Bebchuk, supra note 50, and Hubbard both picture the plaintiff as proceeding in
stages, in much of civil litigation sunk costs are not often in plaintiffs’ control,
because discovery is usually more burdensome for defendants.
Sunk costs and credibility are familiar concepts in warfare. Imagine a Country T
that threatens to invade its neighbor, V, unless the latter cedes control of disputed
territory. V finds the threat incredible because it knows that the cost of invasion to
T is greater than the value of the territory at stake. Imagine that costs and benefits
are similarly assessed by the parties; the territory in dispute is worth 100 to each;
invasion costs T 120 and would impose direct costs of 50 on V; and the invasion
would be successful from T’s perspective because it would control the territory in
question and thus transfer 100 from V to itself. Finally, neither country gains
anything when the other incurs costs. At the outset, T’s invasion threat is not
credible because it must spend 120 to gain 100. It tries to bluff because V’s costs
amount to 150 (the 50 from invasion plus the loss of the territory), but V can see

29

NEW DIMENSIONS IN CRIMINAL DETERRENCE

B. Criminal Deterrence and Sunk Costs
In the context of criminal law, sunk costs derive from law’s
penalties more than they do from any direct expenditures by T. If the
law contains a TH-2/AA-3/AB-25 schedule, then the threat made by
an armed robber (AA) will not always be believed because V knows
that the sanction T faces for execution is 22. T, however, can reverse
the credibility effect by sinking costs through strategic escalation.
Thus, an armed robber might strike or pistol-whip V not only to
frighten V into submission, but also to go beyond the lightly
sanctioned category of aggravated assault, which is the threat stage
in this case, in order to make his threat a battery. T would prefer not
to shoot V because that risks raising the expected penalty yet further,
inasmuch as some room was left for a murder charge. But T can
make his threat increasingly credible by sinking costs in the form of

that from T’s perspective the invasion is too expensive. But imagine further that
the 120 cost to T is the sum of 30 for mobilizing troops, another 30 for amassing
equipment at the border once the troops are in place, and then 60 for the expected
loss of life and equipment in an actual invasion. T might now proceed with
mobilization. Following this first step, V will perceive that T need only spend 90
more in order to gain 100. Once T sinks costs, the threat becomes credible. If V
rationally capitulates after T mobilizes, T will have spent 30 to gain 100.
Virtually every threat can be divided into stages, so this strategy for making
a threat “appear” credible is of significance. As long as T is able to divide
execution costs into stages that each costs less than the benefit to T from
execution, V will capitulate. V can win only if (contrary to the illustration set out
here) it can raise the cost to T of the final stage, as by defeating T’s invading army.
If not, V will comply in an earlier stage, perhaps even saving T the need to incur
any costs at all, if each stage imposes costs on V, and T’s costs are of no benefit to
V. Powerful bullies operate in such environments, the argument goes, and only
rarely need to carry out their threats. The stronger party’s threats are always
credible, and something like concerted or principled reactions are required to
thwart the skilled bully.
Finally, in some situations V can engage in symmetrical and offsetting
staging. In the warfare example V can influence credibility by taking steps that
make capitulation impossible or at least less valuable to T. If V salts the earth, the
disputed territory will be of lower value to T (as well as to V) and T’s threat is
made less credible. Working backward, T will not threaten because it perceives
V’s optimal strategy. Indeed, there should be no threats but only surprise
invasions; the same is true for crimes, where V can destroy the value of what T
seeks to acquire. In reality, and depending on technologies, V chooses a mix of
precautions, including expenditures and sacrifices, that make it a less attractive
target. The former can lead to an arms’ race, while the latter is analogous to a
scorched earth strategy. In turn, T can often increase the expected gains from
execution in order to enhance credibility. T might, for example, build good
highways up to the present border, thereby increasing the expected benefit of
invasion. But for many victims of crime it will be impossible to anticipate threats
and to undertake countermeasures.
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expected penalties on the way to full execution. If V perceives this
sunk-cost strategy, then V will find the initial threat more credible
and will be more likely to submit at an earlier stage. In turn, the logic
of the credibility effect now implies that T will find threat-making
more attractive in the first place.
Where the credibility effect can be reversed so successfully, it
may be a mistake to punish threats lightly. In these situations,
marginal deterrence theory and the credibility effect suggest that law
should choose its line of defense. In some cases, the best strategy is
to apply nearly maximum marginal deterrence to the first act of
violence committed by T, even if that is a threat of greater violence.
The point is to defeat T’s reversal of the credibility effect. Where the
offender is able to sink costs, and where victims will submit because
they perceive that staging is a winning strategy for the offender, the
best deterrence strategy for law is to focus its penalties, and to do so
at an early stage, where T sinks costs and where T’s credibility is not
yet enhanced. If armed robbers always threaten, then pistol-whip,
and then shoot non-submitting victims – because at that point these
offenders have little to lose – then law does best by attacking pistolwhipping, which might be thought of as a point of execution rather
than as an enhanced threat, though of course it is both. Inasmuch as
pistol-whipping is a battery, the TH-2/AA-3/AB-25 schedule may
still be right. 52 The important point is not to create two modest gaps
in an attempt to deter pistol-whipping and then also to deter a
shooting; what is needed is one large gap to maximize marginal
deterrence. If, for example, AB represents aggravated battery and
ABF refers to the greater crime of aggravated battery with a firearm,
as is true in many criminal codes, 53 then law should schedule one
large gap either between aggravated assault and aggravated battery,
or between aggravated battery and aggravated battery with a firearm.
The deterrent should not be dissipated between the two gaps. TH2/AA-3/AB-4/ABF-25 is plausible, as is TH-2/AA-3/AB-24/ABF25. 54 Unfortunately, current law is best described as dissipating
52
The schedule might as well be TH-2/AA-25/AB-0, or equivalently, TH-2/AA25/AB-25, where one who commits an aggravated battery is simply charged for the
threat, or the lesser-included aggravated assault, except that there are cases where
offenders simply shoot without first threatening.
53
See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/12-3(e).
54
The crime of kidnap presents a difficult case when it comes to parrying the
criminal’s sinking of costs. In a ransom kidnap, the offender often sinks costs
before threatening physical harm to the hostage and, of course law’s heavy penalty
for kidnap adds to the sunk cost. The threat of further violence is highly credible.
One problem with lowering the penalty for the threat, or kidnap, is that the victim’s
family might pay the ransom without involving the police. In this case there will be
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rather than concentrating its deterrents. 55
On the other hand, and perhaps unintentionally, judges have
interpreted criminal statutes in a way that comports with the first of
these two recommended schedules, and thus preserves some of the
credibility effect. They have done this by interpreting “use of a
firearm,” or a similar statutory expression, to include not only the
discharge of a firearm but also pistol-whipping. 56 This practice goes
against the traditional schedule in many states. Pistol-whipping, for
example, is often distinguished from discharge of a firearm, leaving a
large gap between “armed with a firearm” and the discharge of the
firearm. 57
Fortunately, there is another reason that the credibility effect is
not easily reversed by a strategic offender. It is that offenders who
sink costs often give away their plans, allowing victims to defend
and law enforcement to be more effective. For example, an offender
who plans to tunnel into a bank vault must invest considerable
resources in the hope of a large payoff. But staging, or sinking costs,
is unlikely to work. Imagine a criminal who sends the following
message to a bank: “Deliver $100,000 to me or I will tunnel into one
substitution towards the under-deterred crime. Kidnap should be thought of as
violence, and law’s deterrent power focused on the kidnap even at the expense of
some marginal deterrence with respect to inflicting physical harm on the hostage.
55
The dissipating nature can be observed by applying Illinois criminal law to this
hypothetical. TH (theft, say pickpocketing a wallet) is punished with 2-5 years’
incarceration. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/16-1(b). AA (assault) generates up to 1 year
imprisonment. §5/12-1(b). AB (aggravated battery) is a Class 3 felony punishable
by 2-5 years (though circumstances can increase this). §5/18-3.05(h). ABF
(aggravated battery with a firearm) is a Class X felony punishable by 6-30 years.
§5/18-3.05(h).
56
The pattern is likely to have less to do with insight about marginal deterrence
and the credibility effect than with perceived toughness on criminals. See Rose v.
Com., 673 S.E.2d 489, 491 (VA. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that pistol-whipping
during a robbery is use of a firearm in aggravated battery); Montgomery v. State,
99 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. App. 2003) (upholding defendant’s aggravated assault
conviction where the defendant exhibited the firearm while threatening to pistolwhip victim). The pattern extends to federal law. See Bailey v. United States 516
U.S. 137 (1995) (holding that “uses a firearm” means “active employment” and not
mere possession of the firearm, in a drug trafficking statute, though active
employment does not require the discharge of the weapon) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(amended after Bailey to include mere possession).
57
In Illinois, for example, use of a deadly weapon and “discharge of a firearm” are
distinguished, and pistol-whipping would fall under the former given that it is not
technically a discharge. The punishment for pistol-whipping, a Class 3 felony, is 25 years (but 5-10 years with aggravating circumstances). 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
§5/12-3.05(h). Meanwhile, inasmuch as aggravated battery by discharging a
firearm is a Class X felony punishable by 6-30 years, there is a large gap between
pistol-whipping and shooting the victim. §5/12-3.0(h).
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of your bank branches and take at least twice that amount. The
enclosed photos will show that my tunnel is well underway, and it is
cheap for me to complete it and finish the job.” On the one hand, the
photos increase credibility because they show that the offender is not
a mere extortionist without the capacity to tunnel into a bank. On the
other hand, the bank can mount defenses at its branches, and police
can begin to look for evidence of tunneling near the branches owned
by the bank that is threatened.
Sinking costs is therefore a good strategy for a threatener only
where the victim has no time to respond or where defensive
maneuvers are very expensive. Criminal threats are most useful
where they are specific and quick, as in the case of an armed robber,
and it is in those cases that law must not help the criminal by
enhancing the credibility of his threat with a heavy sanction. The
discussion in this Part thus strengthens the argument in Part II.A.
Where general threats are concerned, 58 one who threatens to harm a
group in the future has allowed time for a defense to be mounted, so
that the threat is not terribly credible. In any event, law normally
attaches no sanction to a general threat, so that maximum marginal
deterrence also discourages the threatener’s returning to harm the
group.
CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced two new dimensions to deterrence in
criminal law and suggested that these dimensions, or credibility
effects, reinforce the importance of marginal rather than direct
deterrence. We have pointed to the harm that law can do when it
punishes threats severely. The criminal sanction operates as a sunk
cost, reduces marginal deterrence, and makes the escalation of
criminal activity more likely, and crime itself more profitable. It is of
course impossible to identify every situation where decriminalization
or light sanctions for threats are unambiguously desirable, especially
because much depends on the likelihood that victims will have time
to reason about the likelihood that a threat will be executed. Law
must be fairly general in its application, but criminals, victims, and
their circumstances are heterogeneous. They will not uniformly
assess the probability of apprehension, and that probability will in
fact change with location, time of day, the criminal’s skill, and the
victim’s behavior before, during, and after a threat or its execution.
Criminals may also have disparate costs of escalation and different
rates of success with their threats. Neither statutes nor after-the-fact

58

See supra Section II.A.
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judges can specify and identify these differences. It is necessary to
generalize about the credibility of threats and the value of criminal
penalties.
This Article has, however, demonstrated that lawmakers must
resist the temptation to follow the proportionality principle all the
way to the point where criminal law offers a long list of crimes of
increasing severity accompanied by incrementally increasing
penalties. This sort of schedule of criminal sanctions dissipates
marginal deterrence and, most important, makes criminal threats
more credible and more valuable to criminals. In many settings, the
solution is to dramatically reduce the penalty associated with a threat
– even if the threat is as serious as one made by an armed robber who
demands money and threatens to shoot if the victim fails to submit.
Law should focus its deterrent on the shooting rather than the threat,
which is to say the aggravated battery rather than the aggravated
assault. By doing so, the threat itself will become less credible and
less valuable.
In some situations, criminals can sink costs, perhaps simply by
beginning to execute their threats, in order to make them more
credible, and thus to gain submission from their victims. In these
cases, law should focus its deterrent power on a single point, likely
the first display of violence, even if that violence is a threat of a more
serious harm. To do otherwise, is to empower the criminal.
Where an ongoing criminal or terrorist organization is
concerned, primary credibility is so great that deterrence is again best
focused on the initial stage of wrongdoing. In practice, legislators
devise special statutes to combat these threat-making machines. They
might focus on “conspiracy,” “racketeering,” “terrorism,” or even on
membership in a recognized criminal enterprise or terrorist
organization. 59 Common criminals are best deterred by lowering,
rather than raising, the sanctions for criminal threats, but because
organized crime is expert at sinking costs and establishing
credibility, the best deterrence might well be to aim at the
organization’s threats or first displays of violence, rather than its
executions.
Most criminals use an element of surprise and cannot afford to
sink costs and reverse the credibility effect to their own advantage,
because to do so is to give victims the opportunity to defend or call
59

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Effective National and International Action Against
Organized Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities, 4 EMORY INTL L. REV. 9
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for help. In virtually all these cases lawmakers must recognize that,
when law’s sanctions increase the credibility of offenders’ threats,
law itself is part of the problem. Penalties must be rescheduled to
focus law’s deterrent power on the danger of escalation, or execution
of threats. In this way, threats and other gateway crimes, though
lightly sanctioned, will become less profitable to offenders.
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